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Combating Greenwashers in Emerging Markets: A Game-Theoretical
Exploration of Firms, Customers and Government Regulations
Abstract
The sustainability boom in developing countries has caused the emergence of greenwashing behaviors
that are impeding sustainable progress in the third world. To combat greenwashing behaviors in
emerging markets, this paper proposes a game-theory model that studies the competitive pricing
strategies of green incumbents facing competition from greenwashing entrants in emerging markets.
The research considers customer behaviors, greenwashing threats, and the different implications of
anti-greenwashing government enforcement strategies. The results reveal that greenwashing acts are
not always performed with negative intent, but benefit both green incumbents and total customer
surplus if the market greenness gap is small. In addition, a loose enforcement level contributes to
higher social welfare in emerging markets.
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1. Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium, companies in emerging markets have experienced a surge of inter-
est in applying green management systems or creating green corporate branding and images. According
to a study by Nielsen (2014), the propensity to buy socially and environmentally responsible brands
online is apparent in the Asia-Pacific (64%), Latin America (63%), the and Middle East/Africa (63%).
This is because the global sustainability movement has placed significant pressure on such as those
in the aforementioned regions to keep up with developed economies in terms of their environmental
stewardship. Moreover, because of rapid mass urbanization, developing countries face higher resource
depletion and environmental pollution problems. Hence, governments and societies in emerging mar-
kets are proactively pushing their green agendas (Jamali et al., 2017). For example, by 2008, China
had become the largest producer of clean technologies in financial terms; these technologies accounted
for 1.4% of its gross domestic product (ADB, 2012). Further, more than 80 institutions (including
government bodies, non-government organizations (NGOs), and international companies) in emerging
markets (such as Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia) have joined the green development coalition
supported by Chinas ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative to push for the development of product standard-
s and the implementation of green development (Hou, 2018). By 2015, over 95% of Egyptians were
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living in urban areas, increasing the need for sustainable consumption (Hegazy et al., 2017). Driven
by community demands to go green and by the need for effective cost management (Kassaye, 2001),
companies are increasingly claiming their products and services to be “eco-friendly”, “sustainable”,
and “green”. In return, emerging economies are benefiting from improved operating environments
and local markets as well as boosts to the development of environmental technologies (Zadek, 2011).
Apart from the advantages this has brought to the exploitation of natural resources (e.g. less carbon
emission, renewable energy etc.), green growth has also helped emerging markets depart from conven-
tional business practices, which are costly and unrealistic in developing countries. According to OECD
(2012), emerging markets are the most vulnerable to climate change and tend to be more dependent on
natural resources than advanced economies; therefore, they are less likely to achieve long-run success
based on traditional economic growth patterns. Sveen (2013) has also reported that in nearly 70%
of identified cases, emerging markets were leading global innovation projects because of demands for
sustainability.
However, claiming to be green does not necessarily guarantee that a company’s products or ser-
vices are genuinely green. Consequently, greenwashing has become a significant problem and is a side
effect of the greening market (Parguel et al., 2015). Greenwashing has been defined as “disinforma-
tion disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public image”
Soanes & Stevenson (2004). In practice, this means that companies are deceptive in their advertising
and exaggerate the greenness of their products. This leads to unfair market competition between
green and “brown” (greenwashing) firms; consumer green trust, purchase intentions, and word of
mouth being negatively influenced (Chen & Chang, 2013); and the possibility that the entire green
market experience may fail, and that overall social welfare may deteriorate. Despite the short-term
gains of greenwashing, it will lead to a “lose-lose” situation in the long term. Over the past decade,
a large number of greenwashing cases in emerging markets have been reported, despite the boom in
genuine sustainability initiatives. Fernando et al. (2014) have shown that 51.7% of company claims in
India were greenwashed, and most of these (37.7%) were ambiguous. A Canadian-based environmental
market agency investigated the Brazilian green market, finding that 82% of brands were guilty of green-
washing (Moodie, 2015). Bao Steel Group, the largest steelmaker in China, reportedly caused enormous
pollution by emitting large amounts of heavy metals and other chemicals into the environment in early
2013, despite their ambitious claims of heavy investment in green and sustainable initiatives since
2006 (Marquis & Chen, 2013). Despite its prevalence in emerging markets, greenwashing is not unique
to developing countrieslarge firms in developed countries have also greenwashed their products. For
example, Volkswagen’s greenwashing scandal revealed that emission cheating is a common practice for
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many giants in the car industry, including BMW, Ford, and Mercedes-Benz (Lane, 2016). In 2019,
the NGO Truth in Advertising published a list of well-known companies, all in developed economies,
accused of greenwashing (Truthinadvertising.org, 2019). However, greenwashing in emerging markets
significantly differs from that in developed countries because of the different characteristics of these
two types of economy; different approaches are thus required to address greenwashing in developed
and developing economies.
• First, unlike developed markets, which are stable, the competition environment in emerging mar-
kets is heavier and more volatile. As a result, compared with brown firms in developed countries,
brown firms in developing countries are significantly bigger threats to genuinely green firms. Ac-
cording to Joekes & Evans (2008), unfair competition in developing countries places companies in
stronger competitive positions because of the volatility of the rapidly expanding market and the
lack of long-term dominators. The green sector in developing countries is still relatively young,
and green firms have less financial strength to compete with brown firms, who have better cost
advantages. Therefore, a theoretical decision-making support model (e.g., for pricing) that can
map the complexities and provide advice using parameterized solutions may explicitly support
green firms to remain competitive in an uncertain market. Moreover, a theoretical method may
provide governments and policymakers with holistic guidance for optimizing the entire market.
• Second, customers in emerging markets are much more easily deceived than those in developed
markets. Green and sustainability concepts have long been established in developed countries;
hence, customers willing to pay green premiums are more knowledgeable than those in emerging
markets (Panjaitan & Sutapa, 2010). Therefore, the time it takes for customers in emerging
markets to perceive the differences between green and greenwashed offerings has created op-
portunities for greenwashers. This has resulted in reduced benefits for customers, who may be
unconsciously harming their health by opting for products or services from brown firms. The
delay in the market awareness of greenwashing may lead to a drop in customer trust in the whole
green sector.
• Finally, the lack of government enforcement in preventing greenwashing activities in developing
countries means that greenwashing is easier to conduct and less likely to be penalized. As
Delmas & Burbano (2011) have indicated, most developed nations have dedicated regulatory
bodies (such as the Advertising Standards Authority in the United Kingdom, the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission in Australia, and the Canadian Standards Association
in Canada) that discourage the use of vague claims and misleading advertising, while most
3
developing countries have no such regulatory bodies. Hence, green developments in emerging
markets are further hampered by the easy entry of brown firms.
With respect to these special characteristics (delayed customer awareness of greenwashing and weak
government enforcement), it is essential to provide theoretical support to green companies to manage
the challenges presented by brown firms. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the relevant literature and identifies the research gaps. Section 3 explores the underlying problems in
more detail and formulates them mathematically. Section 4 presents the competition outcomes of the
game. Section 5 discusses price and profit, customer surplus, and social welfare. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Related literature
With respect to the proposed research goal, studies related to green behaviors and sustainability
are reviewed first. Next, in light of the research context, the literature on greenwashing is discussed.
Finally, by critiquing various research methods and settings, the novelties of this paper are identified
and summarized as the research objectives.
Following the recent trend in promoting green management in developing economies, extensive
research has been conducted on corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and green concepts in
emerging market business operations (Tang & Zhou, 2012; Shou et al., 2016; Choi & Luo, 2019). As
shown by various researchers (Tang, 2018; Hsu et al., 2016), globalization and stakeholders’ increas-
ing awareness of sustainability are the key drivers pushing emerging markets to be both profitable
and environmentally sustainable. However, various constraints arising from the nature of emerging
markets mean that the green movement cannot be a simple repetition of the green movement in de-
veloped countries. To tackle low productivity in emerging markets, Bai et al. (2017) have developed
a novel path model and promoted green information technology (IT) systems to guide mining indus-
try organizations and managers in developing countries in green supply chain management planning
and investment decisions. Similarly, Khuntia et al. (2018) have explored the value of computerized
information systems in enhancing environmental sustainability in emerging markets, finding a positive
relationship between the implementation of green IT and the reduction of energy consumption via IT
equipment.
Another stream of research has focused on strategic supply chain relationships, investigating how
green agendas and sustainability have influenced sourcing, distributing, and selling strategies in de-
veloping economies. Tang (2018) has simultaneously highlighted the key constraints and existing
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opportunities for companies in developing countries to participate in socially responsible supply chain-
s. Including people living in poverty in supply chain operations may yield mutual benefits for both
companies and society. With respect to supply, Tong et al. (2018) have explored how and why sustain-
able operations are implemented in developing countries; Karnani (2007) has showed the importance of
assisting suppliers in emerging markets promoting business sustainability and boosting the consumer
market; and Vachani & Smith (2008) have claimed that sustainable operations create more job oppor-
tunities and effectively improve the downstream market. Although they have all focused on different
topics, the aforementioned studies have all attempted to leverage opportunities to promote sustainable
development in emerging markets. By contrast, some authors have addressed issues that impede the
growth of sustainability in emerging markets. Jayanti & Gowda (2014) have pointed out that the high
demand for economic development in emerging markets has hindered the progress of sustainability;
their study focuses on the best means of finding a balance between economic growth and sustainability
in the Indian business context. Choi & Luo (2019) have proposed an analytical model to investigate
the influence of poor data quality in emerging economies on firm profit and social welfare. Ahmed et al.
(2019) have found a positive relationship between product quality and environmental practices, show-
ing uncertain product quality in emerging markets. Shou et al. (2016) have identified that information
transparency and legal enforceability in supply chains often leads to contract ineffectiveness in emerging
markets, further harming overall social welfare.
Although greenwashing behavior is evident in emerging markets, the abovementioned papers have
barely considered it. Its existence significantly hampers the growth of sustainability in emerging mar-
kets by harming genuine green firms and causing a deterioration in social welfare (see examples in the
first section). Hence, in a practical sense, it is important to fill this gap and provide insights that are
applicable to the real world. Moreover, filling this gap may open up further research opportunities.
For example, a study by Bai et al. (2017) shows that greenwashers may use green IT systems inappro-
priately; thus, green organizations should consider this in their implementation strategies. Choi & Luo
(2019) could further extend their research on how poor data quality influences green-brown competition
in emerging economies.
Empirical research on the impacts of greenwashing is extensive. Nyilasy et al. (2014) have evalu-
ated the effects of deceptive green advertising and corporate environmental performance on customer
reactions, finding that green efforts can easily backfire when they do not align with firms’ actual en-
vironmental performance. Blome et al. (2017) have studied the effects of supply chain leadership and
ethical incentives on suppliers’ greenwashing activities, finding that leadership styles strongly affect
such activities. However, as Lyon & Montgomery (2015) and Marquis et al. (2016) have demonstrat-
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ed, more theories and models are needed to study greenwashing mechanisms and evaluate their effects
on corporate performance and social welfare. While empirical research on greenwashing is desirable,
methodological limitations may limit the applicability of research outcomes in three ways. First, al-
though empirical research can help identify the interactions between various factors, it is difficult to
advise practitioners on explicit ways to achieve optimization. Second, empirical research may not be
sufficient for identifying the sensitivities of different factors; in turn, some managerial insights may be
overlooked. Finally, it is difficult for empirical research to study dynamic processes when the topic
under investigation is associated with multiple stages and stakeholders. As a result, practitioners lack
decision-making support when external elements are altered or overall objectives change. In addition,
the aforementioned characteristics of emerging markets further constrain the applicability of reviewed
papers. For example, Tang (2018) has argued that consumers in developing countries have compar-
atively lower education levels and limited access to information and technology. Therefore, varying
levels of awareness of green concepts in diverse markets may result in different levels of greenwashing
and different challenges associated with managing it. Moreover, the nature of competition in emerging
economies (Joekes & Evans, 2008) makes it difficult for empirical research to capture dynamic details
and their corresponding influences.
Therefore, this paper aims to provide theoretical support to green companies that can help them
address the challenges presented by brown firms by considering relevant emerging market features.
A mathematical approach may better fit this goal by quantifying all dynamic details in one picture
and supporting decision-making processes with quantified solutions. Mathematical approaches such
as sensitivity analysis or scenario analysis can yield results that differ from those of empirical studies.
This enhances accuracy, especially when the research context is complex and dynamic.
Research on green competition is lacking. The existing literature includes studies on pricing strate-
gies along with green investments or advertising decisions (Yakita & Yamauchi, 2011; Su et al., 2012;
Liu et al., 2012; Du et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2019; Dai & Zhang, 2017; Liu & Chen, 2019); how prod-
uct greenness influences competition in the supply chain both upstream and downstream (Zhang et al.,
2015; Ma et al., 2018); and green and brown product development strategies, with consideration given
to different constraints (Yenipazarli & Vakharia, 2015a,b; Wei et al., 2019; Hong et al., 2018; Ma et al.,
2017). Studies on sustainability-related topics, such as green firms’ competitive decisions and green-
ness designs, are often based on the assumption that firms always behave honestly and give customers
true information about product greenness. Unfortunately, this is never the case when greenwashing
activities occur in emerging markets. Instead, green-based competition in our research setting was
much more complex because greenwashers deliberately concealed real product information and exag-
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gerated product greenness to attract customers. Additionally, various features of emerging markets
(such as longer customer green learning curves and weaker government enforcement environments)
have heightened the complexity of the issues under investigation, but the relevant existing research is
limited in addressing such issues.
To the best of our knowledge, the most similar studies to ours are from Lyon & Maxwell (2011) and
Wu et al. (2020). Lyon & Maxwell (2011) have established an analytical model to study the interac-
tions between firms’ greenwashing behaviors and NGOs’ punitive strategies. However, the authors do
not include the challenges and dynamics of emerging markets in their model. Lee et al. (2018) further
complemented the their study by addressing the effects of competitive forces on firms’ greenwashing
intentions. By contrast, our research aims offer guidelines to incumbent firms in developing economies
to help them better defend themselves against brown entrants who practice greenwashing activities. It
also considers various government anti-greenwashing enforcement (AGE) levels, which Lee et al. (2018)
have missed. Wu et al. (2020) studied the game between profit optimization-driven firms and genuine
socially responsible firms with respect to different information transparency levels. Their study reveals
how information transparency results in greenwashing as well as how such greenwashing affects a firm’s
strategies and the social welfare. Both the positive and negative aspects of greenwashing are identified
subsequently. Comparatively, our research also explores how a firm’s strategies and the social welfare
can be affected by greenwashing related competition, but our research context differentiates our studies
from theirs in two ways. Firstly, our study includes the dynamic customer learning process. This is not
considered in their study, but firms’ strategies ought to be adjusted when customers gradually build
up their knowledge about green products. Secondly, our studies considers the influence of government
enforcement level and tries to help policy makers from government side to better handle greenwashing
behaviour.
In summary, the investigation of greenwashing activities in the emerging markets context sets our
research apart from existing studies. Out study adds greenwashing research to the academic agenda
of sustainability in emerging markets and contributes a new methodological problem formulation to
existing greenwashing studies. Accordingly, green competition, greenwashing activities, customers’








pi Incumbent’s selling price in the two periods.
pe Entrant’s selling price in the second period.
Other Notations
k
Superscript, k ∈ {G,N}, where k = Gmeans entrant adopts greenwashing
strategy; k = N means entrant adopts nongreenwashing strategy.
δ Greenness gap of entrant’s and incumbent’s product.
I Government’s anti-greenwash enforcement level.
Gi Greenness level of incumbent’s product.
Ge Greenness level of entrant’s product.
v Customers’ valuation for unit product greenness, normalized to 1.
x Customer’s type, where x ∈ [0, 1].
t Customers’ unit preference misfit cost.
Cp Penalty cost of greenwashing.
U1i (x) x type customers’ first-period utility towards incumbent’s products.
U2ki (x)
x type customers’ second-period utility towards incumbent’s products un-
der strategy k, where k = {G,N}.
U2ke (x)
x type customers’ second-period utility towards entrant’s products under
strategy k, where k = {G,N}.
d1i Incumbent’s demand in the first period.
d2ki Incumbent’s second-period demand under strategy k, where k = {G,N}.
d2ke Entrant’s second-period demand under strategy k, where k = {G,N}.
πi Incumbent’s profit.
πke Entrant’s profit under strategy k, where k = {G,N}.
Ē The initial unit product environmental impact when greenness is zero.
λ Coefficient parameter for the unit environmental impact.
µ Unit anti-greenwash enforcement cost.
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3.2. Firms and customers
In accordance with the reality that green and brown firms often coexist in emerging markets, we
consider a two-period incumbent-entrant model. In Period 1, the market consists of a monopolistic
green firm (firm i); in Period 2, a brown firm (firm e) enters the market and competes with the green
firm. The two firms offer products in the same category and are situated at the endpoints of a unit
customer interval or linear city. Without loss of generality, we assume the green firm locates at x = 0
and the brown firm locates at x = 1. We denote Gi and Ge as the incumbent’s and entrant’s product
greenness, and the condition Gi > Ge should be satisfied. Note that, as a green firm, the incumbent
has no incentive to be deceptive. However, the brown entrant can choose to greenwash by exaggerating





∈ (0, 1) (1)
in the following analysis1. It denotes the greenness gap of the two firms as well as the entrant’s
greenwashing tendency.
Scenario N : the brown firm does not go greenwashing. Customers’ gross valuation is assumed
to be homogeneous and positively related to products’ greenness level. Therefore, the gross utility for
the incumbent and the entrant can be modelled respectively as Giv and Gev, where v is the green
valuation or green satisfaction generated by unit greenness. Meanwhile, customers are heterogeneous
in their preference for the two firms’ products2. A consumer at preference location x incurs a misfit
cost tx when purchasing from firm i and a cost of t(1 − x) when purchasing from firm e. In the cost
functions, parameter t stands for each customer’s unit distance transportation cost (disutility) caused
by preference misfit.
Considering the selling prices for the incumbent (pi) and the entrant (pe) (see in Cai & Chen, 2011;
Zhang et al., 2019b; Chen et al., 2018), customers’ utility functions can be formulated as
Scenario N

U1i (x) = U
2
i (x) = Giv − tx− pi, x ∈ [0, 1].
U2Ne (x) = Gev − t(1− x)− pNe , x ∈ [0, 1].
(2)
Scenario G: the brown firm chooses to go greenwashing. As mentioned in section 1, customers are
not knowledgeable enough to distinguish between the “true” green products from the “greenwashed”
1The parameter δ characterizes the greenness gap between the two firms’ products. Here, δ → 0 means the two firms’
products have the same level of greenness (i.e., Gi = Ge), while δ → 1 means the entrant’s product greenness reaches
zero (i.e., Ge = 0).
2The two firms’ products can be referred to as clothing by different brands that is produced using similar materials
(e.g., cotton), but comes in different sizes, colors, or packages.
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ones in emerging markets, and this is especially the case for newly launched products. However, in
accordance with general practice, we assume that, by using green products, customers will become more
knowledgeable and less likely to be deceived by greenwashers (the learning effect). This concept is
similar to that proposed by Zhang et al. (2019a) that people will be more experienced after doing the
same thing for a certain period. That is, more experienced buyers will gain the ability to tell the
difference between green products and greenwashed ones. We take the organic food industry as an
example. Some properties (e.g., taste, appearance, etc.) of organic food are highly significant compared
with conventional products (non-organic food); customers can discern these properties and use them
to evaluate the actual product greenness level (Kirchheimer, 2012).
To model this learning effect, we start with the Period 1 problem. Customers whose valuation is
positive (i.e., U1i (x) > 0) will purchase product i in Period 1; otherwise no purchase occurs. We define
Γ1i = {x : U1i (x) > 0} and Γ1−i = {x : U1i (x) 6 0} as the sets of customers who purchase and do
not purchase product i in Period 1, respectively. Therefore, at the end of Period 1, customers can be
divided into two groups: the experienced ones (in set Γ1i ) and the inexperienced ones (in set Γ
1
−i). We
assume that experienced customers will never be misled by greenwashers, but inexperienced customers
are easy targets. Experienced customers are capable of knowing if products are greenwashed, as they
are familiar with the characteristics of genuine green products. By contrast, this is much harder for
inexperienced customers. Therefore, when greenwashing occurs, we assume that only inexperienced
buyers are affected.
In Period 2, considering customers’ greenness learning effect, all customers’ utility toward the
incumbent’s products and experienced customers’ utility toward the entrant’s products remains un-
changed. However, the inexperienced customers’ gross valuation of the entrant’s products changes
from Gev to Giv when the entrant goes greenwashing.
Therefore, customers’ utilities towards the two firms’ products can be formulated as
Scenario G

U1i (x) = U
2
i (x) = Giv − tx− pi, x ∈ [0, 1].
U2Ge (x) =

Gev − t(1− x)− pGe , x ∈ Γ1i .
Giv − t(1− x)− pGe , x ∈ Γ1−i.
(3)
3.3. Government’s anti-greenwash enforcement
Government AGE is modelled as a penalty for greenwashers. Under such enforcement, penalty costs
are imposed on greenwashers (including reputational damage, monetary loss, etc.) when governments
detect their greenwashing activities. We assume that the brown firm’s lump sum penalty cost is
positively correlated with both a government’s AGE level and its exaggerated greenness, which is
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formulated as
Cp = βI0 (δGi)
2 . (4)
In Eq.(4), parameter I0 measures the unit penalty cost and parameter β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that a government will detect its greenwashing activities. As mentioned in section 1, in
emerging markets, both penalty cost and governmental greenwashing-detection efforts are not as high as
they are in developed countries. That is, I0 and β are both relatively low in emerging markets. We use
I to denote the expected unit penalty cost of βI0 in the following analysis. The parameter is regarded
as a proxy of a government’s AGE level. Lower I means the government’s efforts and willingness to
fight against greenwashing acts are weak (which corresponds with the situation in emerging markets),
while higher I denotes a stronger enforcement level (in developed countries) to combat greenwashing
acts.
In addition, the cost function increases convexly in the exaggerated greenness δGi of the brown
firm’s products. Therefore, the brown firm suffers more from greenwashing when the exaggerated
greenness is relatively high; otherwise, customers and governments are more likely to tolerate the
greenwashing activities when the greenness levels of the two products are close.
Without loss of generality, the value of v is normalized to 1 in the following analysis. Changing
the value of v will not generate new insights in our paper.
3.4. Firms’ Problems
For a certain type of brown firm (i.e., greenwasher or non-greenwasher), customers will make their
purchase decisions to maximize their utilities. Customers in the set Γ2ki = {x : U2i > U2ke , U2i > 0}, k =
{G,N} will purchase product i; customers in the set Γ2ke = {x : U2ke > U2i , U2ke > 0}, k = {G,N} will
purchase product e; otherwise, customers will not buy. The demand functions in periods 1 and 2 for











in which k = {G,N}.















e − Cp · 1k, k = {G,N},
(6)
In the indicator 1k ∈ {0, 1}, 1k = 0 when k = N and 1k = 1 when k = G. To ensure both firms’
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demands in Period 2 are positive, we assume the incumbent’s product greenness level is not too high
-that is, Gi 6 3t. In addition, to avoid trivial cases in which the market is always partially covered and
horizontal competition never happens, we also assume that the greenness of the incumbent’s product
is not too low -that is, Gi > t.
3.5. Decision Sequences
In this paper, the incumbent is assumed to be a Stackelberg leader, while the entrant acts as a
follower. The products are assumed to be non-durable. Each customer can only purchase and consume
at most one unit of firm i’s or firm e’s product in each period. In the main model, we assume that
the incumbent sets the same price in the two periods and the price is preannounced in Period 1. This
assumption allows us to model customers’ learning effect and to model the entrant’s strategic decisions.
The specific game sequence is explained below and shown in Figure 1.
• Step 1 : In Period 1, the incumbent sets its optimal price of pi based on the anticipation of
competition from the entrant and its type. Then, customers make their purchasing decisions
in Period 1. After purchasing, customers are categorized as one of two types: experienced or
inexperienced.
• Step 2 : After acknowledging the incumbent’s selling price and customers’ market knowledge
(i.e., experienced or inexperienced), the entrant strategically makes decisions about whether
(k = G) or not (k = N) to proceed with the greenwashing initiative.
• Step 3 : After k is determined, the entrant formulates the optimal selling price pke . Customers
make purchasing decisions to maximize their utilities.
4. Model analysis
In this section, we derive the pricing equilibrium when the incumbent faces competition from a
greenwashing entrant. Based on the game sequence, we solve this model with backward induction.
4.1. Problem in Step 3 : The entrant’s pricing decisions
We start with the problem in step 3, which is the entrant’s pricing decisions based on whether it
is a greenwasher.
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Figure 1: The game sequence.
4.1.1. The entrant is a greenwasher
When the entrant is a greenwasher, inexperienced customers will be deceived and make purchasing
decisions based on the belief that the entrant’s products are green. However, experienced customers
will understand the true greenness of the entrant’s products (denoted Ge), even if the entrant distorts
its greenness information.
The first case we analyzed was one in which the market was fully covered by the incumbent in
Period 1 (i.e., pi 6 Gi − t) (see Figure 2(a)). In this case, all customers will be experienced because
they will all have purchased and used green products during Period 1. For different values of the
parameters Gi, δ, and pi (incumbent’s price), the entrant has three strategies from which to choose:
• Strategy G1: Incumbent Out (G-IO). When pGe 6 pi − t − δGi, the entrant will drive the
incumbent out of the market because all customers’ utility toward product e is higher than that
of product i in Period 2; therefore, they are never motivated to choose product i.
• Strategy G2: Competition (G-C). When pi − t − δGi 6 pGe 6 pi + t − δGi, the entrant will
compete with the incumbent and both firms can have positive market shares.
• Strategy G3: Entry Blocked (G-EB). When pGe > pi+t−δGi, the entrant is unable to penetrate
the market because all customers’ utility toward product e is lower than that of product i. That
is, none of the customers will choose product e.
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Figure 2: Customers’ utility for (a) Scenario G and (b) Scenario N
Using simple algebra to combine the three strategies under different conditions, the entrant’s profit





pGe − Cp, pGe 6 pi − t− δGi. (G-IO)
pGe (t−δGi+pi−pGe )
2t − Cp, pi − t− δGi 6 pGe 6 pi + t− δGi. (G-C)
0− Cp pGe > pi + t− δGi. (G-EB)
(7)
To maximize this function, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. When the entrant chooses to go greenwashing and the market is fully covered by the




2 , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6 Gi − t. (G-C)
0, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (G-EB)
(8)
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Then, we turn to the case when the market is partially covered by the incumbent in Period 1 (i.e.,
pi > Gi − t) (see Figure 2(a)). For different values of parameters Gi, t, δ, and incumbent’s price pi,
the entrant has four strategies from which to choose:
• Strategy G4: Incumbent Out (G-IO). When pGe 6 pi− t−δGi, the entrant drives the incumbent
out of the market.
• Strategy G5: Competition (G-C). When pi − t − δGi 6 pGe 6 (2 − δ)Gi − t − pi, the entrant
directly competes with the incumbent and cannibalizes the incumbent’s market share.
• Strategy G6: Accommodation (G-A). When (2− δ)Gi − t− pi 6 pGe 6 2Gi − t− pi, the entrant
touches with the incumbent, and the market is fully covered by the two firms.
• Strategy G7: Separation (G-S). When pGe > 2Gi − t − pi, the entrant separates with the
incumbent and the market is not fully covered.





pGe − Cp, pGe 6 pi − t− δGi. (G-IO)
pGe (t−δGi+pi−pGe )
2t − Cp, pi − t− δGi 6 pGe 6 (2− δ)Gi − t− pi. (G-C)
pGe (t−Gi+pi)
t − Cp, (2− δ)Gi − t− pi 6 pGe 6 2Gi − t− pi. (G-A)
pGe (Gi−pGe )
t − Cp, p
G
e > 2Gi − t− pi. (G-S)
(9)
Maximizing Eq.(9), we obtain Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. When the entrant chooses to go greenwashing and the market is is partially covered by the




2 , pi >
3Gi
2 − t. (G-S)
2Gi − t− pi, 12+δ−2
√
6δ−2δ2
9 Gi − t 6 pi 6
3Gi
2 − t. (G-A)
t−δGi+pi




9 Gi − t. (G-C)
(10)
Lemma 1 and 2 show the entrant’s best responses when the incumbent’s price (pi) changes. It is
interesting to note that several regions exist in which the entrant will select different entry strategies
and apply different selling prices accordingly. First, when pi is relatively high (i.e., pi > 32Gi−t) and the
incumbent’s market coverage is small, the entrant will be separated from the incumbent and establish
a relatively low price. In this condition, both firms will act as monopolists in Period 2. Second, when
15




9 Gi − t 6 pi 6
3Gi
2 − t),
the incumbent will accommodate the entrant and they will share the total market. In this condition,
the entrant will sacrifice some of its market share by setting a relatively high price to avoid direct
competition with the incumbent. That is, direct competition does not exist in this region. Last, when
pi is relatively small (Gi− t 6 pi 6 12+δ−2
√
6δ−2δ2
9 Gi− t), the incumbent is aggressive, and the residual
market share is small, the entrant must compete with the incumbent for more of the market share and
may face fierce competition from the incumbent. In this condition, their prices will change in the same
direction.
The results shown in Lemma 1 and 2 help us better understand how the incumbent’s pricing
decisions interplay with the entrant’s pricing and entry decisions. Combining the results presented in
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9 Gi − t 6 pi 6
3Gi
2 − t. (G-A)
(t−δGi+pi)2




9 Gi − t. (G-C)
0− Cp, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (G-EB)
(11)
4.1.2. The entrant is not a greenwasher
When the entrant is not a greenwasher, both the “experienced” and “inexperienced” customers
will know the real greenness of product e. We show customers’ utility change with x under different
conditions in Figure 2(b). We first analyze the case when the market is fully covered in Period 1
(i.e., pi 6 Gi − t). In this case, the problem formulation is the same as that in Scenario G. It is






2 , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6 Gi − t. (N-C)
0, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (N-EB)
(12)
Then, we analyze the case when the market is partially covered by the incumbent in Period 1 (i.e.,
pi > Gi − t). For different values of parameters Gi, δ, and incumbent’s price pi, the entrant has three
strategies from which to choose:
• Strategy N4: Incumbent Out (N-IO). When pNe 6 pi − t − δGi, the entrant will drive the
incumbent out of the market.
• Strategy N5: Competition (N-C). When pi− t− δGi 6 pNe 6 (2− δ)Gi− t− pi, the entrant will
16
compete with the incumbent and cannibalize the incumbent’s market share.
• Strategy N6: Separation (N-S). When pNe > 2Gi − t− δ− pi, the entrant will separate with the
incumbent and the market is not fully covered.








e > (2− δ)Gi − t− pi. (N-S)
pNe (t−δGi+pi−pNe )
2t , pi − t− δGi 6 pNe 6 (2− δ)Gi − t− pi. (N-A)
pNe , p
N
e 6 pi − t− δGi. (N-IO)
(13)
Lemma 3. When the entrant chooses not to greenwashing and the market is partially covered by the




2 , pi >
(3−δ)Gi
2 − t. (N-S)
(2− δ)Gi − t− pi, (4−δ)Gi3 − t 6 pi 6
(3−δ)Gi
2 − t. (N-A)
t−δGi+pi
2 , Gi − t 6 pi 6
(4−δ)Gi
3 − t. (N-IO)
(14)
From Eq.(12) and Lemma 3, we can see that the entrant’s market entry decisions are also highly
dependent on the incumbent’s price. As discussed in the greenwashing model, there are also three
market entry strategies from which the entrant can choose. However, when comparing the results from
the two models, we find that the size of the competition region is larger in the greenwashing model,
indicating that the entrant will be more likely to compete with the incumbent. This is because when
the entrant is non-deceptive, customers’ perceived quality of its product will be lower, and the selling
price will drop. In this condition, an accommodating strategy will result in a sharper decline in profit.
To protect its profitability, the entrant must compete with the incumbent for a larger market share.
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3 − t 6 pi 6
(3−δ)Gi
2 − t. (N-A)
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8t , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6
(4−δ)Gi
3 − t. (N-C)
0, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (N-EB)
(15)
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4.2. Problem in Step 2: Entrant’s decision to greenwash or not
Comparing the optimal profits when the entrant is greenwashing in Eq.(11) with not greenwashing
in Eq.(15), we obtain the entrant’s optimal decision w.r.t., incumbent’s selling price pi, and parameters
I, Gi, δ, and t. By defining
Λ =






















in which, ∆̂ = 3+δ−2
√
6δ−2δ2−18Itδ2




2 , we present the entrant’s optimal green-
washing and market entry strategies in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (Entrant’s Response)
The entrant will
(a) go greenwashing when pi > Λ and I 6 2−δ4tδ . Specifically,
(1) if pi > 3Gi2 − t, it will be seperated from the incumbent (G-S);
(2) if pi 6 3Gi2 − t, it will accommodate with the incumbent (G-A).
(b) not go greenwashing when (pi 6 Λ and I 6 2−δ4tδ ) or I >
2−δ
4tδ . Specifically,
(1) if pi > (3−δ)Gi2 − t, it will be separated from the incumbent (N-S);
(2) if (4−δ)Gi3 − t 6 pi 6
(3−δ)Gi
2 − t, it will accommodate with the incumbent (N-A);
(3) if pi 6 (4−δ)Gi3 − t, it will compete with the incumbent (N-C).
Proposition 1 and Figure 3 illustrate the entrant’s optimal pricing and market entry strategies when
pi is exogenously given. First, when the AGE level I is relatively low and the incumbent’s price is
relatively high, the entrant will be likely to engage in greenwashing. This conforms to the notion that
lower penalties will encourage entrants to engage in greenwashing activities to increase their profits
by deceiving inexperienced customers. Additionally, with a relatively high pi, the market coverage
of the incumbent firm will become smaller, meaning that more customers will be inexperienced in
Period 2. Under this condition, greenwashing to gain a green valuation may deceive a higher number
of inexperienced customers. Nevertheless, the market expansion of greenwashers has no effect on
experienced customers. As Lemma 1 and 2 demonstrate, when the two firms are separated from or
accommodate each other, the entrant will never engage in greenwashing and thus will never compete
with the incumbent under a greenwashing strategy.
When AGE level I is high, or incumbent’s selling price pi is relatively low, the entrant will not










(1 + ∆̂0)Gi − t
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Figure 3: Entrant’s responsive decisions. Note: ∆̂0 = ∆̂|I=0.
modes: 1) it will choose to be separated from the incumbent when pi is high (in Region N-S ); 2) it will
accommodate the incumbent when pi is moderate (in Region N-A); 3) it is highly likely to compete
against the incumbent when pi is very low (in Region N-C ). This makes the current case fully different
from the greenwashing case. The thresholds in Figure 3 will move downward if: 1) the products from
each side (the entrant and the incumbent) are more highly differentiated (i.e., with higher t); or 2)
the entrant has a high degree of greenness (i.e., higher δ). In either case, the area of greenwashing
region (i.e., Region N-S +Region N-A) will expand, implying that when the entrant’s product is more
horizontally differentiated from the incumbent’s product or if the entrant’s greenwashing degree is
relatively low, it is more likely to be a greenwasher with the given pi.
4.3. Problem in Step 1: The incumbent’s pricing decision
Continuing with the backward induction, we then study the incumbent’s optimal decisions. By
anticipating the entrant’s responsive price and market entry decisions (shown in Proposition 1), the
incumbent will choose its selling price to maximize its profits. In regions G-A, G-S, N-A, and N-S, it
can be seen that the entry of a brown firm will have no impact on the incumbent’s market share or
profit with a fixed pi. However, in regions N-C, the incumbent’s market share will shrink in Period
2 because of competition from the entrant. Based on the results from Proposition 1, we express the
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t , pi > min(Λ1,
(4−δ)Gi






+ pi(3t+δGi−pi)4t , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6 min(Λ1,
(4−δ)Gi
3 − t). (b)
2pi, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (c)
(16)
Subproblem (16a) represents the case in which the entrant’s entry does not affect the incumbent’s
market share. This occurs when the incumbent’s selling price is so high that its market coverage is
relatively small. However, in Subproblem (16b), when the incumbent’s price becomes relatively lower,
the incumbent’s market coverage increases, and the entrant must compete with the incumbent. Then,
in Subproblem (16c), when the incumbent sets an extremely low selling price, the entrant never has
a chance to enter the market. This subproblem only exists when the entrant’s greenwashing degree is
very high (δ ≥ tGi ) or the two products are much more differentiated (i.e., Gi ≥
t
δ ). With Eq.(16), the
incumbent’s decision is to choose an optimal pi that maximizes the total profit function.
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium results.
Lemma 4. With the entry threat of a brown firm who can choose to go greenwashing, the equilibrium
results are presented in Table 2.
The conditions in Table 2 are defined as follows:
ΩG−A1 :=
{








( 1Gi , δ) : ρ2(δ, I, t) 6
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Gi




































































in which, functions ρ1(δ, I, t) and ρ2(δ, I, t) are defined in Table B6 in Appendix B.
The incumbent’s and entrant’s decisions are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. (Equilibrium Strategies)
(a) When ( 1Gi , δ) satisfies conditions Ω
G−A1 or ΩG−A2, the incumbent’s optimal price will incentivize

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) under condition ΩG−A1, the entrant does not affect the incumbent’s decisions;
(2) under condition ΩG−A2, the entrant hurts the incumbent’s profit.
(b) When ( 1Gi , δ) satisfies conditions Ω
N−S, ΩN−A1, ΩN−A2, ΩN−C1, or ΩN−C2, the incumbent’s
optimal price will prevent the entrant from being a greenwasher. Specifically,
(1) under conditions ΩN−S and ΩN−A1, the entrant does not affect the incumbent profit;
(2) otherwise, the entrant hurts the incumbent’s profit.
δ

























(a) Decision zones when I = 1
2
and t = 1.
δ

















(b) Impacts of I on greenwash region when t = 1.
Figure 4: Decision zones shaped by δ, I and 1
Gi
.
Proposition 2 highlights the important role that parameters Gi and δ play in both firms’ pricing de-
cisions and the entrant’s greenwashing and market entry strategies. In particular, if a product’s green-











the entrant will choose to engage in greenwashing, which the incumbent will tolerate. Figure 4(a)
clearly illustrates the above results.
The reasons for these results are twofold. First, for a fixed δ, when Gi is small, the incumbent has
less market expanding ability and the market coverage shrinks in Period 1. Consequently, inexperienced
customers will be less able to assess the true greenness of the entrant’s products if the entrant is a
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greenwasher. Instead, they will perceive the entrant’s products to be as green as those of the incumbent.
Hence, customers will be willing to pay more for greenwashed products, establishing a higher product
price than that of non-greenwashed products. Thus, when Gi is relatively low, the entrant will be
more motivated to deceive customers. Consequently, the incumbent can manipulate its product prices
to prevent deception by the entrant, but this will be harmful to its overall profits and sales margin.
Second, for a fixed Gi, we find that lower values of δ will encourage entrants to engage in green-
washing. Although a high δ may enhance a greenwashing entrant’s sales revenue, it will also generate
a higher penalty cost. To balance this trade-off, the entrant will never engage in greenwashing when
δ is high. Moreover, the incumbent will be much less competitive against the entrant if the entrant
is greenwashing under a high δ. This may further harm its profit when greenwashing is tolerated.
When the incumbent acknowledges this, a high δ value will lead the incumbent to be more likely to
compromise its sales margin in exchange for higher market coverage. As a result, the entrant will
be prevented from greenwashing. Overall, it will be easier for the entrant to engage in greenwashing
behaviors when the incumbent’s greenness level is low and the greenness gap between the two parties
is small.
Figure 4(a) illustrates that, when the incumbent’s greenness level (Gi) is low and the entrant’s
potential greenwashing degree (δ) is high (in regions N-S ), the market will be partially covered and
the two firms will be separated from each other. Under this condition, greenwashing will have no impact
on the incumbent’s decisions. When Gi is moderate (see regions G-A1, G-A2, N-A1 and N-A2 ), the
entrant will accommodate the incumbent. In these regions, direct competition will be avoided, but
the market will be fully covered. In the accommodation regions, a relatively high greenness level (in
regions G-A2 and N-A2 ) will push the incumbent to be more conservative and intentionally set a
higher selling price. By doing this, the incumbent will remain with a smaller market share and avoid
direct competition with the entrant. Conversely, when the greenness level is low (in Region G-A1 and
N-A1 ), the entrant’s greenwashing will have no impact on the incumbent’s decisions. Last, when the
greenness level is high (in Region N-C1 and N-C2 ), direct competition between the two firms will be
inevitable, and greenwashing activities will be prevented because of the wide greenness gap between
the two companies.
Figure 4(b) shows the effects of the government’s AGE level I on the entrant’s optimal greenwashing
or non-greenwashing regions. It conforms to the intuition that a stricter enforcement environment will
weaken the entrant’s motivation to greenwash. Specifically, by using simple algebra to analyze the
boundaries of regions G-A1 and G-A2, we find that when enforcement is strict (i.e., I = 10), the area
of the greenwashing region shrinks to nearly zero, and greenwashing by the entrant is unlikely to be an
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option. Conversely, when the enforcement level is low (i.e., I = 110), the area of the greenwashing region
expands. However, the non-greenwashing region still exists, indicating that even when greenwashing
activities cost almost nothing, it is still possible that the entrant will choose not to greenwash under
certain conditions.
5. Discussions
5.1. Prices and profits
To study the impacts of the brown firm’s entry threat to the incumbent, we compare the main
model with Model NE (see Appendix A). The results are shown in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. (Impacts of brown firm’s entry on incumbent’s profit)
Considering the brown firm’s entry threat,
(a) when ( 1Gi , δ) satisfies conditions Ω
G−A1, ΩN−S, and ΩN−A1, such entry does not affect the incum-
bent’s price decision and optimal profit;
(b) otherwise, such entry incents the incumbent to raise its price, but it harms the profit.
Proposition 3 shows that when Gi is relatively small, the incumbent’s initial market share will also
be small. The entrant will not have sufficient competitive power to cannibalize the incumbent’s market
share. Therefore, there will be no direct competition between the two firms, and the incumbent will
remain in a monopolist position. However, when Gi is relatively high, the incumbent’s initial market
share will be relatively high as well. Thus, the entrant can easily cannibalize the incumbent’s market
share with little loss of its sales margin. That is, a higher Gi will induce intense competition and harm
the incumbent’s profits.
To study the impact of the entrant’s greenwashing activities, we compare the main model with
Model NGE (see Appendix A). The results are shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. (Impacts of greenwashing on equilibrium prices and profits)
In the presence of greenwashing acts,
(a) the incumbent will raise its price and gain higher profit in Region ΩG−A2. Otherwise, greenwashing
has no impact on the incumbent’s pricing decisions and profit.
(b) the entrant will raise its price to gain higher profit in both regions ΩG−A1 and ΩG−A2. Otherwise,
greenwashing has no impact on the entrant’s pricing decisions and profit.
Proposition 4 shows that when the entrant chooses to be a greenwasher, both firms may raise
their selling prices in the greenwashing regions. While it is reasonable for the entrant to raise its
prices to avoid direct competition with the incumbent, it is counterintuitive for an incumbent to
24
also raise its price when facing a powerful entrant. This can be explained as follows: when two
products are differentiated horizontally, greenwashed products can increase customers’ perceived value
of brown products. In turn, the increased selling price generates more profits from the entrant’s
market share, which also protects the entrant from direct competition with the incumbent. Following
the same logic, the incumbent may not attempt to directly compete with the entrant by also raising its
price. This will cause a drop in the incumbent’s market share, but this may be offset by the absence
of potential competition-related loss. In summary, Proposition 4 illustrates that in a horizontally
differentiated market, the entrant’s greenwashing activities may ease competition between the two
firms, thus benefiting both firms under some conditions.
Next, we investigate the impacts of δ on both firm’s optimal prices, demands, and profits in the
main model. The results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Sensitivity results of parameter δ
Conditions ΩD−A1 ΩD−A2 ΩN−S ΩN−A1 ΩN−A2 ΩN−C1 ΩN−C2
p∗i − ↓
(




if δ > δ̃
)
− − ↓ ↑ −
p∗e − ↑
(




if δ > δ̃
)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(d1∗i , d
2∗
i ) (−,−) (↑, ↑)
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if δ > δ̃
)
(−,−) (−,−) (↑, ↑) (↓, ↑) (−, ↑)
d2∗e − ↓
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if δ > δ̃
)
↓ − ↓ ↓ ↓
π∗i − ↑
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if δ > δ̃
)




if δ 6 min
(




↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Note: 1) Symbols ‘↑’, ‘−’ and ‘↓’ indicate the underlying parameter is increasing, unchanged and decreasing
with δ respectively.
Proposition 5. (Impacts of δ on profits)
In Region ΩG−A2,
(a) when δ > δ̃, the incumbent’s profit decreases in δ; otherwise, it increases in δ,
(b) when I > 1t and δ > δ̂, the entrant’s profit increases in δ; otherwise, it decreases in δ,













Intuitively, when the entrant’s greenness level drops (i.e., δ rises), the competition between the
two firms will be less intensive, and the incumbent will enjoy a better business environment. However,
because of the entrant’s greenwashing activities in this model, the incumbent’s profits may be negatively
influenced if the greenness gap between the two firms widens. This paper defines this phenomenon
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as the Greenness-Premium Trap, in which the incumbent’s greenness advantage will not contribute to
its competitiveness but will, conversely, cause a drop in its profits. Note that the trap only exists in
Region ΩG−A2, in which the two firms accommodate each other and parameter δ is relatively high.
This indicates to green firms that when faced with a potential greenwasher, increasing their greenness
is not always a better choice. To enjoy their greenness premium, green firms should invest in enhancing
their greenness and escaping the trap.
δ

































































To better illustrate the results from propositions 5(a) and (b), we present a numerical example in
Figure 5 in which parameter values are set as I = 4, t = 1, and Gi =
5
3 . In the greenwashing region
in Figure 5(a), the incumbent’s equilibrium price is convex for δ, while the entrant’s is concave for
δ. Moreover, Figure 5(b) shows that the incumbent’s equilibrium demand is concave for δ, while the
entrant’s is convex in δ. It can be seen that when δ is relatively low (i.e., δ 6 δ̃), the rise in δ will
make the incumbent more aggressive by reducing its price for market share expansion. As a result, its
profit will increase with δ in this region. However, when δ becomes relatively high (i.e., δ > δ̃), the
entrant’s greenwashing penalty cost will rise, and it will be less motivated to engage in greenwashing.
Rather, the incumbent’s market position will be threatened if the entrant gives up greenwashing and
targets the production and sales of genuine products. To avoid such competition, the incumbent will
remain conservative in its market activities. As a result, the entrant will enjoy a steady profit increase
along with the rise in δ. Such an increase in profit may even offset the increased penalty costs from
the entrant’s greenwashing activities.
Interestingly, we also find that a rise in δ may even benefit the entrant when δ > δ̂ and I > 1t
(see Figure 5(c)). As explained above, when δ is relatively high, the entrant’s market share will rise
as the incumbent’s desire for competition is reduced. Next, we investigate the impact of government
enforcement level I on the two firms’ profits.
Proposition 6. (Impacts of I on profits)
In the presence of greenwashing,
(a) In Region ΩG−A1, the incumbent’s profit is not affected by I, while the entrant’s profit decreases in
I;
(b) In Region ΩG−A2, the incumbent’s profit decreases, while the entrant’s profit increases in I;
(c) Otherwise, parameter I has no impacts on both firms’ profits.
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Figure 6: Profits change w.r.t. δ and I when Gi =
5
3
and t = 1.




3 and t = 1. This shows that when a government’s AGE is stricter (i.e., a higher value
of I), the incumbent’s profit will decrease while the entrant’s profit will increase. This will only occur
when a green firm tolerates a brown firm’s greenwashing behaviors. Increasing I will intensify market
competition and subsequently harm a green firm’s profit. This also implies that a government’s AGE
will be ineffective in protecting incumbent green firms’ benefits. By contrast, incumbent green firms
will embrace weak enforcement policies, even though their brown rivals may engage in greenwashing.
5.2. Customer surplus
In this subsection, we compare the customer surplus (CS) in the main model with that in Model NE
and Model NGE, respectively, to study the impacts of brown firm’s entry and brown firm’s greenwashing
acts on CS. Based on the equilibrium results presented in Table 2, Table A5, and Eq.(A2), CS for the
three models can be calculated, and these are presented in Appendix B. Expressions for K1 −K4 and
J1 − J3 are presented in Table C6 in Appendix C.
Proposition 7. (Main model v. Model NE)
(a) In the non-greenwashing regions, two thresholds (K1 and K2) exist, and when K1 6 1Gi 6 K2, the
entry of an imitator hurts CS; otherwise, the entry of a brown firm benefits CS.




entry of an imitator benefits CS; otherwise, the entry of a brown firm hurts CS.
Proposition 7 presents the effects of a brown firm’s entry on CS. A numerical example is depicted
in Figure 7(a), and shows that customers do not always benefit from a new entrant. In the non-
greenwashing regions, the entry of a non-deceptive brown firm with a moderate Gi (i.e., K1 6 1Gi 6 K2)
will reduce total CS. However, for both high or low levels of Gi, the entry of a brown firm will benefit
CS.
The reasons for this are twofold. First, when Gi is high (i.e.,
1
Gi
6 K1), the entry of a brown firm
results in fierce competition between the two firms. In contrast with a monopoly, the incumbent will
lower its selling price to compete with the brown firm during selling periods. Therefore, total surplus
increases as a greater quantity of low-price products are supplied to the market. Second, when Gi
is low (i.e., 1Gi > K2 in regions Ω
N−S and ΩN−A1), the entry of a brown firm has no impact on the
incumbent firm or its buyers. However, the total surplus may still increase if more customers switch
to purchasing from that brown firm. By contrast, a moderate Gi will lead to a more conservative role
for the incumbent with a higher selling price by mitigating direct competition with the brown firm.
Although this will not change the market share, it will decrease CS because customers are paying more
for products.
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Next, we turn to the greenwashing region. Unlike the results seen in the non-greenwashing region,
only low levels of Gi and δ will benefit CS, while a higher Gi or higher δ may harm CS. This is because
when Gi or δ is high, customers paying high prices for brown products from the greenwashing entrant
will not be able to enjoy the expected green valuation. Hence, the total CS will also fall.
(a) Main model v.s. Model NE
(b) Main model v.s. Model NGE
Figure 7: Comparison of customer surplus when t = 1 and I = 3
2
. Note: In the shadowed (blank) area, entry of a
greenwasher leads to higher (lower) customer surplus.
Proposition 8. (Main model v. Model NGE)
(a) In the non-greenwashing regions, three thresholds (J1, J2, and J3) exist, and when max{J2, J3} 6
1
Gi
6 J1, greenwash benefits CS; otherwise, greenwash hurts CS.
(b) In the non-greenwashing regions, greenwashing has no impact on CS.
Proposition 8 reveals the effects of the entrant’s greenwashing activities on CS. As shown in Figure
7(b), greenwashing has no natural impact on firm profit or CS in the non-greenwashing region. However,
it is interesting that in the greenwashing region, when a brown firm chooses to greenwash and the
incumbent tolerates this act, a region exists in which greenwashing benefits CS. A similar result that
firms’ greenwashing acts may generate welfare benefits is also presented in Wu et al. (2020). In their
paper, they have provided sufficient explanations for this counter-intuitive phenomenon, - that is
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moderate CSR information transparency will induce a profit maximizer to overinvest in CSR, thus
increase welfare benefits. However, in our models, the result can be explained in another way. With
algebraic analysis, the shaded region in Figure 7(b) indicates that greenwashing behavior expands
the incumbent’s market coverage but shrinks the entrant’s market coverage because more people will
purchase from the incumbent for better product value. Eventually, the total CS will increase due to
the CS gain from the incumbent, which will outweigh the CS loss from the entrant.
5.3. Social welfare implications
The preceding analysis suggests that firm profitability and CS are affected by the regulator’s AGE
level. In this section, we investigate the impacts of AGE on total social welfare. By engaging in
greenwashing behaviors and exaggerating their true greenness level, brown firms may expand their
market coverage. This results in the emergence of more brown products in the market, causing a
stronger environmental impact. Hence, it is crucial to establish appropriate enforcement levels to
impede the consumption of brown products and protect the environment. In the following section,
we incorporate environmental impact and social welfare in the whole market for two periods, before
moving onto the problem of maximizing total social welfare by adjusting the enforcement level.
(1) Environmental Impacts (ENV): Since the environmental impact of brown products is more
severe than that of green products, following Cachon (2014), the unit environmental impact (in mon-
etary terms) of green and brown products is modelled respectively as (Ē − λGi) and (Ē − λGe). In
the formulation, the unit environmental impact for each product decreases with respect to product
greenness. To ensure the positivity of unit environmental impact, Ē is assumed to be sufficiently large.
Combining the results presented in Table 2, under a certain level of I, the total environmental impact
can be formulated as
ENV = (Ē − λGi)(d1i + d2i ) + (Ē − λGe)d2e. (17)






which is convexly increasing in the enforcement level I. This formulation indicates that the marginal
effect of unit expense is decreasing.
(3) Government’s Finance Income (GFI): The penalty costs for brown firms’ greenwashing acts
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Finally, Social welfare (SW) consists of πi, πe, CS, ENV , GFI and EXP , which can be formulated
as
SW = f1(πi + πe) + f2(CS +GFI − ENV )− EXP. (20)
In this equation, we introduce two weight parameters. f1 denotes the weight of economic value
and f2 denotes the weight of social value. The two parameters satisfy f1 + f2 = 2 and 0 6 f1, f2 6 2.
In existing studies, economic value and social value are treated as equal factors in social welfare (i.e.,
f1 = f2 = 1) (Yenipazarli, 2016). However, in practice, we observe that many governments in emerging
markets concentrate more on economic growth than on social value (Uken, 2013; Guo & Ma, 2008).
That is, when creating regulations, governments in emerging markets tend to allocate more weight
to economic value than to social value (i.e., f1 > 1). In developed countries, the opposite is true
-governments are oriented more toward social value (i.e., f2 > 1). Therefore, different values of f1 and
f2 will result in different regulator target functions, eventually leading to different regulations.
The government’s objective is to maximize social welfare by setting an optimal I. Attributable to
its complexity, there is no analytical expression of the optimal I. Therefore, we conduct numerical
analysis to study the government’s optimal anti-greenwashing regulation design. The values of the
parameters are set as δ = 0.1, Gi = 5/3, Ē = 1, λ = 0.5, t = 1, µ = 0.01, and f1 = 1.2 in Figure 8.
The sensitivity analysis results are shown in Table 4.
Observation 1. In the greenwashing region, social welfare is concave in I; however, in other regions,
social welfare is decreasing in I.
Figure 8 illustrates an interesting result: with an increase of I, the entrant will move from the
greenwashing region to the non-greenwashing region. This means that when a government imposes
stricter enforcement, the entrant is less likely to engage in greenwashing. We also notice that SW
does not change monotonically with I; rather, it first increases and then decreases in I, illustrating
the existence of an optimal point (I∗ = 1.383) that achieves maximal social welfare (SW ∗ = 0.7344).
However, in the non-greenwashing region, social welfare always decreases with I, showing no need for
a higher enforcement level.
Observation 2. (a) The government’s optimal anti-greenwashing enforcement level is concave in δ,
while monotonically decreasing in Gi and f1.
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Figure 8: Social welfare changing with I.
(b) The maximum social welfare is monotonically decreasing in δ, while increasing in Gi.
Table 4: Impacts of parameters δ and Gi on the optimal I and SW
f1 Gi δ = 0.05 δ = 0.10 δ = 0.15 δ = 0.20 δ = 0.25 δ = 0.30
1.4
8/5 (0.238,1.4247) ( 1.044, 1.3676) (1.130, 1.3222) ( 0.841, 1.2408) ( 0.679, 1.2300) (0.598, 1.2192)
5/3 (0.000, 1.6164) ( 0.519,1.5636) (0.747, 1.5148) ( 0.690, 1.4701) ( 0.588,1.4277) (0.473, 1.3811)
26/15 (0.000, 1.8036) (0.022, 1.7608) (0.361, 1.7118) (0.430, 1.6661) ( 0.404,1.6234) (0.358,1.5833)
1.2
8/5 (0.448, 0.7854) ( 1.383, 0.7344) ( 1.355, 0.6981) ( 1.062, 0.6618) ( 0.832, 0.6256) (0.665, 0.5905)
5/3 (0.192, 0.9653) ( 0.875, 0.9153) ( 0.987, 0.8749) ( 0.825, 0.8375) ( 0.663, 0.8016) (0.536, 0.7675)
26/15 (0.000, 1.1416) ( 0.402, 1.0969) ( 0.614, 1.0553) ( 0.573, 1.0175) ( 0.483, 0.9823) (0.399, 0.9494)
1.0
8/5 (0.674, 0.1466) ( 1.891, 0.1043) ( 1.678, 0.0792) ( 1.236, 0.0483) ( 0.934, 0.0160) (0.723, -0.0154)
5/3 (0.472, 0.3149) ( 1.367, 0.2703) ( 1.332, 0.2396) ( 1.019, 0.2085) ( 0.775, 0.1777) (0.598, 0.1486)
26/15 (0.262, 0.4800) ( 0.907, 0.4365) ( 0.975, 0.4031) ( 0.781, 0.3723) ( 0.601, 0.3433) (0.462, 0.3165)
0.8
8/5 (0.919, -0.4916) ( 2.876, -0.5162) ( 1.846, -0.5305) ( 1.321, -0.5587) ( 0.999, -0.5891) (0.778, -0.6185)
5/3 (0.779, -0.3345) ( 2.257, -0.3680) ( 1.788, -0.3846) ( 1.289, -0.4119) ( 0.952, -0.4407) (0.701, -0.4676)
26/15 (0.630, -0.1804) ( 1.700, -0.2173) ( 1.553, -0.2391) ( 1.109, -0.2650) ( 0.793, -0.2908) (0.570, -0.3140)
0.6
8/5 (1.189, -1.1292) ( 2.877, -1.1520) ( 1.847, -1.1844) ( 1.322, -1.2289) (1.000,-1.2741) (0.779,-1.3147)
5/3 (1.120, -0.9829) (2.758, -0.9954) (1.789, -1.0336) (1.290,-1.0819) ( 0.984,-1.1302) (0.775, -1.1760)
26/15 (1.044,-0.8392) ( 2.611, -0.8311) ( 1.716, -0.8756) (1.247 -0.9279) (0.958, -0.9794) (0.760, -1.028)
Table 4 and Figure 9 illustrate the impacts of parameters δ, Gi. and f1 on the optimal I and the
maximum SW .
First, it can be seen that the optimal I is concave in δ with a fixed Gi. This means that with
either a significant low or high δ, the government should exert a low enforcement level. This is because
when δ is low, the entrant’s greenness level will be high, and, in turn, greenwashing activities will
have greater effect on CS as well as on the environment. Therefore, a higher enforcement level will be
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(a) f1 = 1.4














Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis of parameters f1, Gi and δ
unnecessary. Conversely, when δ becomes high, the incumbent will voluntarily combat the entrant’s
greenness behaviors to protect its own profitability. Under this condition, it is also necessary for
the government to set a high enforcement level. However, for a moderate value of δ, because the
incumbent has less incentive to combat greenwashers, the government must set a higher enforcement
level to protect the environment and CS. Therefore, the optimal I is concave in δ.
Second, intuitively, an optimal I will monotonically decrease with Gi. This indicates that when the
incumbent’s product greenness is high, the government should impose a less strict enforcement level.
Table 4 and Figure 9 also shows that the optimal SW always decreases with Gi and increases with δ,
which conforms to intuition as well.
Third, it is interesting that governments tend to have a lower enforcement level with a higher
f1. This is because a stricter enforcement level may restrict a firm’s economic benefits (see Figure
6), even though it may improve CS and reduce environmental impacts. Considering the economy-
centric attitude in emerging markets, the results explain why greenwashing activities are prevalent in
developing countries, but are seldom countered by their governments.
6. Conclusions
In an era of global sustainable development, greenwashing activities remain an issue for both
industry and governments, especially in emerging markets. To deal with existing greenwashing issues
in emerging markets, a novel two-period game model was established, with consideration given to
governments’ AGE regulations. In the game model, the incumbent acted as the Stackelberg leader,
while the entrant acted as the follower. Using backward induction, the entrant’s decisions about
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greenwashing, market entry mode, and selling price in Period 2, and the incumbent’s decisions on
selling price in periods 1 and 2, were obtained. The effects of the entrant’s greenwashing activities
and the model’s critical parameters (including the incumbent’s greenness level, the entrant’s potential
greenwashing degree, and the government’s AGE level) on prices, profits, and CS were explicitly
discussed. In addition, how governments could maximize social welfare by making optimal decisions
on AGE levels was also explored.
The main insights are summarized as follows:
• First, when a green firm’s greenness level and an entrant’s greenwashing degree are both relatively
low, it is counterintuitive that the green firm would tolerate the brown firm’s greenwashing
activities. That is, an entrant’s greenwashing acts may benefit the incumbent to some extent.
This is because in a horizontal competitive environment, a non-greenwashing entrant can only
threaten the incumbent’s market share using a low-price strategy. In this sense, accepting a
certain degree of greenwashing may be beneficial to an incumbent’s overall profitability. However,
in other regions, greenwashing is not beneficial at all and can be prevented by the incumbent
through strategic pricing mechanisms.
• Second, it was observed that in the presence of greenwashing activities, the total CS may rise in a
small region. It was shown that when the greenness gap between green and brown firms is small
and the green firm’s greenness is moderate, the entrant’s greenwashing behavior eases competition
and benefits the incumbent with a larger market share. Consequently, the total CS increases
because the rise of the incumbent’s CS outweighs other losses. Nevertheless, greenwashing has
no benefits to CS outside this small region.
• Third, we investigated governments’ regulatory decisions to optimize social welfare with respect
to their different preferences for economic or social value. The numerical examples show that
the optimal enforcement level in the greenness gap is concave. This means that governments
should only impose a strict enforcement policy for moderate greenness gap levels, while strict
policies are less necessary for narrow or wide greenness gaps. Meanwhile, sensitivity analysis
indicate that economically focused governments in emerging markets prefer loose enforcement
levels compared with governments in developed markets. Our results partially explain why
greenwashing activities are prevalent in developing regions and why governments take fewer
actions in developing contexts.
In contrast with the existing literature, this paper extends the research on green-brown competition,
government regulation, and incumbent-entrant gaming by incorporating firms’ greenwashing activities,
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thus providing meaningful managerial insights for industry and governments to achieve both economic
and environmental sustainability.
In addition to its contributions, this study also had some limitations. First, only two firms were
considered. This provides the opportunity to extend the model horizontally with multiple entrants
or vertically with upstream suppliers. Second, this model assumes that a firm’s greenness is prede-
termined, whereas in reality, greenness levels may be random and stochastic. Third, future empirical
studies may potentially reveal more insights and open up additional research opportunities.
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Appendix A. Special cases
We provide two special cases, enabling us to study the impacts of the brown firm’s entry threat and the
brown firm’s greenwashing act by comparing them with the base model. In the first case, the green firm is a
monopoly without a rival’s entry threat (Model NE ). In the second case, the green firm faces competition from
a non-deceptive brown firm (Model NGE ).
Model NE: We start with the benchmark, where there is no threat of an entrant. In both periods, customers
will buy the incumbent’s products if and only if U1i (x) > 0 and U2i (x) > 0. Therefore, customers located within







will purchase the products; otherwise, there is no purchase. The demands







. The total profit function is







By maximizing the incumbent’s profit function, we obtain the optimal price, demand, and profit and the

















, Gi ∈ [t, 2t] .
(A.2)
As Eq.(A.2) shows, when the greenness level is relatively high (i.e., 2t 6 Gi 6 3t), the market is fully covered
in both periods. As the greenness level drops, the market becomes partially covered, and the firm sets a lower
price. This monopoly case indicates that product greenness level plays an important role in the determination
of selling prices, market coverage, and profit.
Model NGE: We next analyze the benchmark where the entrant is a non-deceptive brown firm. Compared
with the main model, the entrant’s Period 2 decision is always k = N . The solution of the game is quite similar
to the main model; therefore, we omit the proof for the equilibrium results. By defining five regions as follows,


















































Table A.5 presents the incumbent’s and entrant’s optimal decisions and corresponding profits. As it shows,
when the greenness level is relatively high, the two firms will compete directly; when the greenness level is
moderate, the two firms will accommodate each other; when the greenness level is very low, the market is not
fully covered and the two firms are separated, with no competition involved.
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Table A.5: Equilibrium results for Model NGE
Condition




































































































Appendix B. Computing results for CS in the main model, Model NE, and Model NGE




U1i (x|p∗i )dx︸ ︷︷ ︸




U2i (x|p∗i )dx︸ ︷︷ ︸




UN2e (x|p∗e)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buy from entrant in period 2
(B.1)
CS in main model and Model NGE can be expressed respectively as
























































































































































U1i (x|p∗i )dx︸ ︷︷ ︸




U2i (x|p∗i )dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buy from entrant in period 2
(B.4)
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CS in Model NE can be expressed respectively as
Model NE : CS =
t, Gi ∈ [2t, 3t]G2i
4t , Gi ∈ [t, 2t]
(B.5)
Appendix C. Definitions of thresholds
The thresholds in the paper are presented in Table C.6.
Table C.6: Definitions of thresholds
ρ1(δ, I, t) =

ρ11(δ, I, t) :=
1+2∆̂
2t
, δ 6 (1 + 3It)−1
ρ12(δ, I, t) :=
1+2Itδ
2t
, (1 + 3It)−1 6 δ 6 (1 + 2It)−1
ρ13(δ, I, t) :=
1+2∆̃
2t
, δ > (1 + 2It)−1
ρ2(δ, I, t) =







, ρ21(δ, I, t) > 6−δ13











































80000δ2∆̂2 + (−34600δ + 320000∆̂ + 77600)δ∆̂t
+(33100δ2 − 69200δ∆̂− 48449δ − 471700∆̂2 + 155200∆̂ + 95349)t2
Appendix D. Proofs
Appendix D.1. Lemma 1









2t − Cp, pi − t− δGi 6 pGe 6 pi + t− δGi. (G-C)
0− Cp pGe > pi + t− δGi. (G-EB)
(D.1)
• For scenario G-IO,
∂πGe
∂pe
> 0 is always hold. Therefore, in region pGe 6 pi − t − δGi, the optimal decision
is pG∗e = pi − t− δGi, the maximum profit is
πG∗e = pi − t− δGi − Cp (D.2)
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2 . Since p
G
e is positive, it is




8t − Cp, max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6 Gi − t.
0− Cp, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0).
(D.3)
Comparing the optimal profit in the three scenarios, we find that when pi 6 Gi− t, Scenario G-C dominates
the other two scenarios. The maximum price decision is presented in Lemma 1.
Appendix D.2. Lemma 2-3
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2-3 is similar to that of Lemma 1. Therefore, it is omitted.
Appendix D.3. Proposition 1
Proof. The results presented in Proposition 1 can be obtained by comparing the entrant’s profit in Eq.(11) and
Eq.(15). As shown in Figure D.10, the whole region can be divided into five parts.
Figure D.10: Comparison of entrants’ profit under greenwash and no greenwash.
• In the first part (i.e., pi 6 12+δ−2
√
6δ−2δ2
9 Gi− t), comparing the profits of scenarios G-C and N-C, we find
that the profit of N-C is always higher than that of G-C.
• In the second part (i.e., 12+δ−2
√
6δ−2δ2
9 Gi − t 6 pi 6
(4−δ)Gi
3 − t), comparing the profits of scenarios G-A
and N-C, we find that (1) when pi > (1 + 3+δ−2
√
6δ−2δ2−18Itδ2
9 )Gi − t and I 6
1−δ
3δt , the profit of G-A is
higher than that of N-C; (2) otherwise, the profit of N-C is higher than that of G-A.
• In the third part (i.e., (4−δ)Gi3 − t 6 pi 6
(3−δ)Gi
2 − t), comparing the profits of scenarios G-A and N-A,
we find that (1) when I 6 1−δ3δt , or when
1−δ
3δt 6 I 6
1−δ
2δt and pi > (1 + Itδ)Gi − t, the profit of G-A is
higher than that of N-A; (2) otherwise, the profit of N-A is higher than that of G-A.
• In the fourth part (i.e., (3−δ)Gi2 − t 6 pi 6
3Gi
2 − t), comparing the profits of scenarios G-A and N-S, we
find that (1) when I 6 1−δ2δt , or when
1−δ
2δt 6 I 6
2−δ




2 )Gi − t, the profit of
G-A is higher than that of N-S; (2) otherwise, the profit of N-S is higher than that of G-A.
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• In the fifth part (i.e., pi > 3Gi2 − t), comparing the profits of scenarios G-S and N-S, we find that when
I 6 2−δ4δt , the profit of G-S is higher than that of N-S; (2) otherwise, the profit of N-S is higher than that
of G-S.
Based on the above results, the entrant’s response is summarized in Proposition 1.
Appendix D.4. Lemma 4




t , pi > min(Λ1,
(4−δ)Gi






+ pi(3t+δGi−pi)4t , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6 min(Λ1,
(4−δ)Gi
3 − t). (b)
2pi, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (c)
(D.4)
• When δ 6 11+3It , the condition Λ1 6
(4−δ)Gi










+ pi(3t+δGi−pi)4t , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6 Λ1. (b)
2pi, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (c)
(D.5)






















































iii) For subproblem (c), the optimal price and profit can be calculated as
(p∗i , π
∗
i ) = (max(δGi − t, 0), 2 ∗max(δGi − t, 0)). (D.8)































6 ρ2(δ, I, t).
(Gi − t, (8t+(δ−1)Gi)(Gi−t)4t ),
1
Gi
6 min( 6−δ13t , ρ2(δ, I, t))
(D.9)
• When δ > 11+3It , the condition Λ1 >
(4−δ)Gi




t , pi >
(4−δ)Gi






+ pi(3t+δGi−pi)4t , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6
(4−δ)Gi
3 − t. (b)
2pi, pi 6 max(δGi − t, 0). (c)
(D.10)

































Substituting the results in (D.9) and (D.11) into the entrant’s responsive functions, we obtain the final
results in Table 2.
Appendix D.5. Proposition 2-3
Proof. The results in Proposition 2 can be obtained by comparing the incumbent’s optimal price and profit in
the main model (see Table 2) with that in Model NE (see Eq.(A.2)).
The results in Proposition 3 can be obtained by comparing the incumbent’s optimal price and profit in the
main model (see Table 2) with that in Model NGE (see Tab.A.5).
Appendix D.6. Proposition 4
Proof. In region ΩG−A2, the incumbent and the entrant’s profits are
π∗i =






The first and second derivatives w.r.t. parameter δ for the incumbent’s profit function are as follows
∂π∗i
∂δ









−6 + 4δ(1 + 9It)√





= − 2Gi(Gi − 2t+ 2Gi∆̂)√







−6 + 4δ(1 + 9It)√
6δ − 2δ2 − 18Itδ2
)2
(D.14)
Because in region ΩG−A2, Gi satisfies
1
Gi
6 1+2∆̂2t , the first part of Eq.(D.14) is negative. Also, it is easy to
verify that the second part is negative. Therefore,
∂2π∗i
∂δ2 < 0, which means the incumbent’s profit is convex in δ.
Solving the first order condition, i.e.,
∂π∗i























−6 + 4δ(1 + 9It)√















−6 + 4δ(1 + 9It)√
6δ − 2δ2 − 18Itδ2
)2
− 2IG2i (D.17)
Solving the first order condition, i.e.,
∂π∗e












It is difficult to prove the positivity of the second order derivtive. However, by substituting δ̂ into Eq.(D.17),
we find that when I > 1t ,
∂2π∗e
∂δ2 |δ=δ̂ > 0 holds. Therefore, the function is concave in δ at point δ = δ̂.
Appendix D.7. Proposition 5






= −(δGi)2 < 0. (D.20)
In region ΩG−A2, we have
∂π∗i
∂I



















6δ − 2δ2 − 18Itδ
(3− 2δ − 5
√
6δ − 2δ2 − 18Itδ).
(D.22)
For δ 6 11+3It , 3− 2δ − 5
√





Appendix D.8. Proposition 6-7
Proof. The results can be obtained by comparing the CS for the main model (See Eq.(B.2)) and Model NE (See
Eq.(B.5)).
The results can be obtained by comparing the CS for the main model (See Eq.(B.2)) and Model NGE (See
Eq.(B.3)).
Appendix E. Extension: Customer group updating
In the main model, we assume that the two firms are facing the same group of customers with the same
learning effect after consuming products in Period 1. Then, the customer group needs to be updated, as the
old customers may be replaced by new ones at a later time. To characterize this effect, we define a customer
group updating rate as γ ∈ (0, 1). Specifically, we assume that after staying in the market for one period, γ
amount of customers will leave the market, and the rest (1− γ) will stay in the market to become experienced
customers. At the beginning of Period 2, another γ amount of inexperienced customers will enter the market.
Note that γ → 0 means the customer group updating rate is zero and the problem has already been studied
in the manuscript; while γ → 1 means all the Period 1 customers will leave the market and be replaced by
newcomers in Period 2. To ease our analysis, we assume that the numbers of customers who leave the market
and those who come into the market are equal, which ensures that the updating rate is steady and the market
size does not change.
In the following analysis, we vary the level of customer group updating rate (γ) to investigate its impacts on
the two firms’ competitive behaviors and equilibrium outcomes. We use superscript u to denote firms’ pricing
decisions in the presence of customer updating. For customers who stay in the market (1 − γ), their learning
effect exists and the entrant’s profit functions in response to the incumbent’s pricing decisions are the same as
those in the basic model (see section 4.1). For customers who enter the market in Period 2, (γ), their learning
effect is inactive. That is, the newcomers cannot detect the brown firm’s greenwashing activities. The detailed
proof for the entrant’s responsive profit functions are omitted for expositional simplicity. We only show part of
the results as follows:
(1) Entrant’s responsive profit functions and conditions




4t − Cp, pi >
3Gi





3Gi − t 6 pi 6
3Gi
2 − t. (G-A,G
u-A)







9 Gi − t 6 pi 6
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3 − t 6 pi 6
(3−δ)Gi
2 − t. (N-A,N
u-A)
(t−δGi+pi)2
8t , max(δGi − t, 0) 6 pi 6
(4−δ)Gi








2 Gi − t,












9(1−γ) Gi − t,
Λu5 =
γ+8It
2γ δGi − t.
By comparing the profits, Figure E.11 shows the entrant’s optimal entry strategy. We can see that the same
combinations of pi and I may result in different equilibriums for the new and repeat buyers. For example, in
Region III, the incumbent’s pricing will incentivize the entrant to go greenwashing and compete for new buyers
(Gu −C), and it will stop the entrant moving into the incumbent’s market share for repeat buyers. Comparing
this to Figure 2, under the consideration of customer group updating, we can see that the competition scenario
exists when the entrant chooses to go greenwashing.
(2) The incumbent’s problem
Considering the entrant’s responses, the incumbent will optimally set its selling prices w.r.t. different values




t , (pi, I) ∈ I, II, V, V I.



















+ (1− γ)pi(3t+δGi−pi)4t + γ
pi(3t−pi)
4t , (pi, I) ∈ IV .
(E.3)
(3)Numerical results
Note that when γ → 0, the problem equals the main model. Because of the problem’s complexity, it impos-
sible to obtain the analytical solutions. Therefore, numerical tests are conducted to illustrate some important
results. In the numerical tests, the exogenous parameters are set as Gi =
5
3 , t = 1, I = 4, γ = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3},
and δ = {0, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.25}. The impacts of γ on both firms’ profits and equilibrium strategies are shown
in Figure E.12. Comparing the results with those in the main model (See Figure 5(c)), our key findings still
stand. This means that the assumption about customers’ repeat purchasing does not influence the main results.
Interestingly, we find that the incumbent’s and the entrant’s profits are decreasing in parameter γ in the “green-
wash” region. This indicates that when the customer updating rate is low, more customers will be experienced
in Period 2. This will intensify competition between the two firms, thus leading to a “lose-lose” outcome.
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Figure E.11: Entrant’s responsive decisions.
(a) Incumbent’s profit (b) Entrant’s profit
Figure E.12: Impacts of γ and δ on profits and equilibrium strategies.
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